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It is not unusual for domestic courts to be called upon to settle cases relating to armed conflict taking place within the territory of a sovereign state. Nevertheless, this decision can be regarded as unique in national case-law, since the Russian Constitutional Court was asked to pronounce upon the lawfulness under international law of coercive measures by a State against a segment of its own population seeking to secede from the state. In fact, this could well be the first time a national court has been called upon to scrutinise compliance by a state's armed forces with international rules concerning the protection of civilians and the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict 5 .
This paper will briefly comment upon the determinations of the Court. It will focus in particular on two issues, namely (0 whether the Chechen Republic had a right of secession under international law and (if) whether Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or other rules of international humanitarian law applied to the armed conflict in Chechnya.
II. The Right of the Chechen Republic to Secession
In order to ascertain the constitutionality of the acts under discussion, the Court had to tackle a preliminary question: whether or not, under Russian constitutional law, the Chechen Republic had the right to secede unilaterally from the Russian Federation. Clearly, had the Court found a basis for such a right, the decrees in questions aimed at preventing the Chechen secession could not have been constitutional.
In the event the Court found that:
[T]he Constitution of the Russian Federation, like the previous Constitution of 1978, does not envisage a unilateral resolution of the issue of changing the status of the subject of the Federation and its secession from the Russian Federation" legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply'. Moreover, in the opinion of the Court:
[T]he constitutional goal of preserving the integrity of the Russian State accords with the universally recognised principles concerning the right of nations to self-determination.
In this connection, the Court mentioned the first part of the 'saving clause' of the 1970 U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations to the effect that the right to selfdetermination should not be construed as authorising or encouraging any acts leading to the dismemberment or complete disruption of territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people. The saving clause provides that: 'Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [laying down the principle of self-determination] shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour".
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It follows that, under the saving clause, only those states having a 'representative government' which makes no distinction as to race, creed or colour can claim that their right to territorial integrity must not be affected by secessionist groups, since their central governments comply with the principle of self-determination.
What is it meant by 'representative' in the context of the clause under discussion? In other words, when can a secessionist group claim that it is not 'represented' and is consequently entitled to self-determination? According to some commentators, the language of the saving-clause warrants the following conclusions. Firstly, if racial and religious groups living in a sovereign State are denied access to the political decision-making process, they have the right to internal self-determination. Secondly, these groups are also entitled to seek secession (i.e. they have the right to external self-determination) if they face 'extreme and unremitting persecution' and there exists no 'reasonable prospect for a peaceful challenge'.
10
Whether or not one shares this view, it seems unquestionable that the saving clause has been misconstrued in the judgement under discussion. The Court, rather surprisingly, failed to mention the last part of the saving clause quoted above. In so doing, it avoided the central issue raised by that saving-clause, i.e. is the Government of the RF sufficiently representative and not discriminating? Plainly, without some examination of the representative nature of the Russian government the U.N. 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations could not support the determination of the Court to the effect that the principle of territorial integrity envisaged in the Russian Constitution is in accordance with general international law.
11 In other words, it appears that the Court jumped to a conclusion and simply took it for granted that, under the 1970 Declaration and its saving clause, the Chechen Republic was not entitled to the right to secession on the grounds of the principle of selfdetermination. Rather paradoxically, the Court would appear to have based its judgment in part on a international instrument providing for the right, under extreme circumstances, to secession of groups living within the territory of sovereign states.
m. The Applicability of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the Armed Conflict in Chechnya
As mentioned earlier, the applicants argued that two decrees of the central authorities were unconstitutional, contending that they had resulted in a violation of article 15 of the Russian Constitution, under which all international law is part of the Rus- 
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It has been noted by a distinguished commentator that if the principle of self-determination is taken as a criterion for wars of national liberation, 'these wars would encompass all armed struggles against the denial of self-determination, including those which may take place in plural States'. Bearing this in mind, the author at issue has questioned whether Art. 1, para. 4, of Protocol
The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court did not dwell on this matter and seemed to take it for granted that the conflict in Chechnya was covered by Protocol II. Another point which deserves to be highlighted is that the Court clearly spelled out that the provisions of Protocol II are binding upon both parties to the armed conflict, i.e. that the Protocol confers rights and imposes duties also on insurgents. This statement is all the more important if one considers that, at the Geneva Conference, some States expressed the opposite view, for they were eager to keep rebels at the level of criminals without granting them any international status.
19 This view has also found support in the legal literature.
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It is important to emphasise the determination by the Court that the Russian Parliament had failed to pass legislation to implement Protocol n, and that this failure was one of the grounds -probably even the primary ground -for non-compliance by Russian military authorities with the rules embodied in the Protocol. It is probably true that the enactment of ad hoc legislation to implement Protocol II was necessary even if Article. 15, para. 4, of the Russian Constitution provides that international treaties are part of the Russian domestic legal system: indeed Protocol II cannnot be considered as self-executing in all its provisions.
However, it is fitting to emphasise that the Court altogether ignored the fact that a set of international treaty rules governing internal civil strife have now become part of customary international law. 21 Article 15, para. 4, of the Russian Constitution provides that 'commonly recognised principles and norms of international law' are a component part of the internal legal system. Arguably, these customary rules are self-executing in that they do not need implementing legislation.
22 If this contention is accepted, it follows that such customary rules could and should be applied by II, which refers only to people fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, should be constructed as limited to these three specific cases of denial of self-determination. This author has concluded that an exstensive construction of that Article whereby the enumeration of the specific types of situations is illustrative and not exhaustive, 'is more in accord with the spirit of the Protocol and the Conventions; for if we proceed from a humanitarian point of view, we have to favour the application to as many conflicts as possible. This has been the systematic policy of the ICRC; and it is through the prac- 
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Russian military authorities even in the absence of any national implementing legislation. Strikingly, the Constitutional Court completely ignored the existence of this body of customary rules and principles and focused solely on Protocol n.
TV. Concluding Remarks
In spite of these apparent flaws in the Court's reasoning, its decision must be commended for the strongly internationalist outlook it reflects. The Court has given pride of place to international law, by taking into account international rules and principles in assessing the constitutionality of the challenged decrees. This approach clearly demonstrates that the Court is fully aware of the close interplay between constitutional and international law. The Court proves to be fully conscious that even the highest bodies of the Russian Federation must comply not only with constitutional provisions, but also with international rules whenever such rules impinge upon the conduct of State organs at home or abroad. Under the principle of the rule of law laid down in the Russian Constitution, the Court emphasised that 'the bodies of power in their activities are bound both by internal and international law*.
This laudable approach has manifested itself not only in the various points made by the Court on international law relating directly to the Chechen conflict, but also in two more specific respects. First, the Court has expressly directed the Russian Parliament to implement Protocol II, thus showing how much importance it attaches to actual compliance with that treaty. Secondly, the Court underscored that according to the Russian Constitution and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 'victims of any violations, crimes and abuses of power shall be granted efficient remedies in law and compensation for damages caused'. In this way the Court has established the applicability of these human rights instruments to remedy at least the most blatant violations of international humanitarian law.
This decision thus clearly demonstrates that the Russian Constitutional Court has become an important institution promoting compliance with international law in the Russian legal system.
